A searing indictment of US strategy in Afghanistan from a distinguished military leader and West Point military historianââA remarkable bookâ (National Review).
In 2008, Col. Gian Gentile exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals with an article titled âMisreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Armyâs Conventional Capabilities,â that appeared in World Politics Review. While the years of US strategy in Afghanistan had been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts began to question the necessity and efficacy of COINâessentially armed nation-buildingâin achieving the United Statesâ limited core policy objective in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda.
Drawing both on the authorâs experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War and his research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentileâs views of the failures of COIN, as well as a trenchant reevaluation of US operations in Afghanistan.
âGentile is convinced that Obamaâs âsurgeâ in Afghanistan canât work. . . . And, if Afghanistan doesnât turn around soon, the Democrats . . . who have come to embrace the Petraeus-Nagl view of modern warfare . . . may find themselves wondering whether itâs time to go back to the drawing board.â âThe New Republic